Group Exemptions for Exclusive Distribution Agreements in the Common Market by McGrath, William T.
NORTH CAROLINA JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
COMMERCIAL REGULATION
Volume 9 | Number 2 Article 3
Spring 1984
Group Exemptions for Exclusive Distribution
Agreements in the Common Market
William T. McGrath
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/ncilj
Part of the Commercial Law Commons, and the International Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina
Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation by an authorized editor of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information,
please contact law_repository@unc.edu.
Recommended Citation
William T. McGrath, Group Exemptions for Exclusive Distribution Agreements in the Common Market, 9 N.C. J. Int'l L. & Com. Reg.
231 (1983).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/ncilj/vol9/iss2/3
Group Exemptions for Exclusive Distribution
Agreements in the Common Market
by William T. McGrath*
A United States company that has decided to expand its sales base
by marketing goods in the European Economic Community (EEC) has a
variety of means by which it can set up sales operations.I It can integrate
vertically, either by setting up its own sales branches throughout the
countries in the EEC or by acquiring a company already possessing
wholesale or retail sales capabilities, or it can market its goods through
commercial agents, which are individuals or entities that act as sales rep-
resentatives for manufacturers, without taking title to the goods they
sell.2 The most frequently used marketing method in the Common Mar-
ket is selling through a distributor. A distributor differs from a commer-
cial agent in that a distributor buys the goods at a discount and resells
them at his own risk.3 This article deals with "exclusive distribution
agreements," in which a supplier allots to a single distributor a defined
territory in which the distributor concentrates his sales efforts. In return
for the efforts of the distributor, the supplier agrees not to supply any
other distributor in the contract territory. The article also deals, to a
lesser extent, with "exclusive purchasing agreements," in which the pur-
chaser agrees to obtain certain goods exclusively from a single supplier.
* Associate, Chadwell & Kayser, Ltd., Chicago, Illinois, B.A. 1973, University of Notre
Dame; J.D. 1976, Washington University.
I See Jones, Practical Aspect of Commercial Agency and Distrbution Agreements in the European
Community, 6 INT'L LAW. 107 (1973).
2 Contracts with commercial agents normally do not fall within the scope of the Common
Market laws regulating competition. See European Commission Notice on Exclusive Dealing
Contracts with Commercial Agents, December 24, 1962, 1 COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 2697.
3 The European Commission distinguishes between "commercial agents" and "independ-
ent traders" such as distributors, essentially on the presence or absence of risk.
The Commission regards as the decisive criterion, which distinguishes the com-
mercial agent from the independent trader, the agreement - express or implied
- which deals with responsibility for the financial risks bound up with the sale or
performance of the contract . . . . [A] commercial agent must not by the nature
of his functions assume any risk resulting from the transaction. If he does assume
such risks, his function becomes economically akin to that of an independent
trader and he must therefore be treated as such for purposes of the rules of
competition.
Id See also Puelinckx & Tielemans, The Ternnnation of Agency and Distributorship Agreements: A
Comparative Study, 3 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 452 (1981); W. VAN GERVEN & F. LUKOFF, COM-
MERCIAL AGENCY AND DISTRIBUTION AGREEMENTS AND RELATED PROBLEMS OF LICENSING
IN THE LAW OF THE EEC COUNTRIES AND OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (1970).
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Exclusive distribution agreements have been a matter of considera-
ble interest in the Common Market, 4 particularly because there is a cer-
tain degree of tension between the types of restraints present in an
exclusive distribution agreement and basic principles of the Common
Market which call for the elimination of territorial barriers and the pro-
hibition of restrictions on competition. 5 These agreements tend to re-
strict intrabrand competition in a distributor's territory by limiting or
precluding sales by other distributors in the territory. In addition, exclu-
sive agreements may deprive competing distributors of a source of sup-
ply.6 On the other hand, exclusivity creates certain efficiencies in the
marketing of goods, and is essential to distributors to protect their capital
investments and to justify promotional expenditures.
This article reviews the treatment of exclusive distribution agree-
ments under the competition laws of the Common Market. Because ex-
clusive distribution agreements usually contain restrictions on
competition which are incompatible with Article 85(1) of the Treaty of
Rome,7 these agreements are permissible only if they qualify for an "ex-
emption" under Article 85(3)8 of the Treaty. In 1967, the EEC Commis-
4 See Champaud, The Group Exemptions of EEC Regulation 67/67, 5 Common Mkt. L. R. 23
(1967) ("the exclusive agreement has been the centre of theoretical jousting in the Community,
both in the judicial and administrative field, so that it has become a star subject of Community
law").
5 Ets. Consten and Grundig-Verkaufs G.m.b.H. v. EEC Commission, 196 E. Comm. Ct.
J. Rep. 299, [1961-1966 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8046; HAWK, UNITED
STATES, COMMON MARKET AND INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST: A COMPARATIVE GUIDE 576
(1979).
6 HAWK, supra note 4, at 595.
7 Treaty of Rome (EEC) Article 85(1) states:
1. The following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common mar-
ket: all agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertak-
ings and concerted practices which may affect trade between Member States and
which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of
competition within the common market, and in particular those which:
(a) directly or indirectly fix purchase or selling prices or any other trading
conditions;
(b) limit or control production, markets, technical development, or invest-
ment;
(c) share markets or sources of supply;
(d) apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trad-
ing parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage;
(e) make the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other par-
ties of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to commer-
cial usage, have no connection with the subject of such contracts.
8 Treaty of Rome (EEC) Article 85(3) states:
3. The provisions of paragraph I may, however, be
declared inapplicable in the case of:
- any agreement or category of agreements between undertakings;
- any decision or category of decisions by associations of undertakings;
- any concerted practice or category of concerted practices;
which contributes to improving the production or distribution of goods or to pro-
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sion (Commission) issued Regulation 67/67, 9 which created a "group
exemption" or "block exemption" for exclusive distribution agreements
meeting certain conditions. Recently, in June 1983, the Commission is-
sued two new regulations to replace Regulation 67/67, which expired on
June 30, 1983. Regulation 1983/8310 deals with exclusive distribution
agreements and Regulation 1984/8311 deals with exclusive purchasing
agreements.
Although much has been retained from Regulation 67/67, the new
regulations contain some significant changes. A thorough understanding
of the new regulations requires familiarity with the provisions of Regula-
tion 67/67 and its interpretation by the Commission and the European
Court of Justice. Accordingly, this article will review the past applica-
tion of the group exemption for exclusive distribution agreements and
will discuss the changes brought about by regulations 1983/83 and
1984/83. It is hoped that the article will provide United States lawyers
with a basis for auditing existing agreements for exclusive distribution in
the EEC to determine whether they are in conformity with the new regu-
lations. It will also provide guidance for those who will be drafting these
agreements or counselling clients on the subject.
I. Treatment of Exclusive Distribution Agreements Under EEC
Competition Law
The legality of exclusive distribution agreements was tested early in
the history of the Common Market. Some of the Commission's first deci-
sions concerning competition law involved these agreements.1 2 The most
important decision was the decision of the Commission on the Grundig-
Consten agreement, 13 in which the Commission ruled on an exclusive dis-
moting technical or economic progress, while allowing consumers a fair share of
the resulting benefit, and which does not;
(a) impose on the undertakings concerned restrictions which are not indis-
pensable to the attainment of these objectives;
(b) afford such undertakings the possibility of eliminating competition in
respect of a substantial part of the products in question.
9 Regulation 67/67, 57 O.J. EUR. COMM. 894 (1967), 1 COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH)
2727.
to Regulation 1983/83, 25 O.J. EUR. COMM. (Supp.) 10 (1983), 1 COMMON MKT. REP.
(CCH) 2733.
11 Regulation 1984/83, 25 O.J. EUR. COMM. 7 (1982), 1 COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH)
2733.
12 See, e.g., Decision of the Commission on D.R.U.-Blondel Agreement, [1965-1969 Trans-
fer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 9049 (exclusive distribution agreement granted an
exemption under Article 85(3)); Decision of the Commission on Hummel-Isbecque Agreement,
[1965-1969 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 9063 (same); Decision of Commis-
sion on Jalatte Agreements, [1965-1969 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 9083
(same). For discussion of these and other early Commission decisions, see Cohen, The Application
of Article 85 of The Treaty Estabhshing the European Economic Community to Exclusive Dealing Agree-
ments, 18 W. RESERVE L. REV. 826 (1967) and Hahn, Exclusive Dictributorship Agreements in the
European Common Market, Anttrust Laws on the Move, 16 AM. U. L. REV. 367 (1967).
13 Decision of the Commission on Grundig-Consten Agreement, 7 J. 0. COMMON EUR.
2545, 3 Common Mkt. L. R. 489 (1964). The importance of the case is indicated by the fact
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tribution arrangement between Grundig, a German manufacturer of
electronic appliances, and Consten, a distributor in France. The distri-
bution agreement provided that Consten would act as the exclusive rep-
resentative of Grundig in France. Consten agreed not to sell any articles
that would compete with the Grundig products and also agreed not to
make, directly or indirectly, any deliveries to other countries. In turn,
Grundig agreed not to deliver its goods to any other persons in France
and also prohibited its distributors in other countries from shipping
Grundig equipment into France. In addition, Grundig authorized Con-
sten to use Grundig's "GINT" trademark, and Consten registered that
mark under its own name in France. Grundig registered the distribution
agreement with the Commission, and the Commission ruled that the
agreement violated Article 85 of the Treaty. Grundig and Consten then
brought actions in the Court of Justice to annul the Commission deci-
sion. The Court of Justice affirmed the Commission's decision, in major
part, and held that the restrictive provisions of the agreement fell within
the prohibition of Article 85(1) and did not satisfy the conditions for an
exemption under Article 85(3).I4
The Court of Justice announced several principles that have become
cornerstone& of Common Market competition law. First, rejecting the
argument that Article 85 applies only to horizontal agreements, the
Court of Justice held that it applies to all agreements which distort com-
petition, regardless of whether the parties are at different levels in the
chain of distribution. 15 The Court also rejected arguments that Article
85 should be interpreted under a "rule of reason" and that restrictions on
intrabrand competition should escape the prohibition of Article 85(1)
when they have the effect of increasing interbrand competition. 16 The
that the Commission held a press conference to discuss the significance of the decision. See
Ladas, Exclusive Distribution Agreements and the Common Market Antitrust Law, 9 ANTITRUST BULL.
761 (1964). The Grundig case was the subject of a substantial amount of legal commentary in
the mid- 1960's. See, e.g., Hahn, Exclusive Dittributorshi Agreements in the European Common Market,
16 AM. U. L. REV. 367, 378-83 (1967); Ellis, The Legah ofExclusive Distrbutorships Under Common
Market Antitrust Law, 9 ANTITRUST BULL. 775 (1964); Fulda, The Exclusive Dstributor and the
Antitrust Laws of the Common Market of Europe and the United States, 3 TEX. INT'L LAw FORUM 209
(1967); 80 HARV. L. REV. 1594 (1967).
14 Ets. Consten and Grundig-Verkaufs G.m.b.H. v. EEC Commission, [1961-1966 Trans-
fer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8046. The Court of Justice, while agreeing with the
Commission that certain provisions in the agreement violated Article 85(1), annulled the Com-
mission's decision insofar as it held the entire contract to be nullified. The Court found the
objectionable provisions to be severable and permitted the balance of the agreement to remain
in effect. Id at 7653-54.
15 The Court stated:
An agreement between producer and distributor that is designed to restore the
national partitions in trade between Member States could conflict with the basic
objectives of the Community. The EEC Treaty, whose preamble and text are
designed to remove the barriers between the States and which, in a number of its
provisions, strongly combats their reappearance, cannot permit enterprises to cre-
ate new barriers of this type. Article 85, paragraph 1, pursues this goal, even in
the case of agreements between enterprises that are at different economic levels.
Id at 7650-51.
16 Id at 7652.
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Court noted that under Article 85, when the purpose of the agreement is
to prevent, restrict, or distort competition, it is not necessary to consider
the actual effects of the agreement. Because the agreement between
Grundig and Consten was designed to maintain separate national mar-
kets, it distorted competition within the Common Market. Conse-
quently, the Court of Justice ruled that the Commission did not err by
refusing to consider the effects of the agreement on interbrand
competition. 17
The most important precept enunciated in the Court's decision is
the doctrine of "absolute territorial protection." When the relationship
between the parties contains features that make imports into the contract
territory from other sources impossibile, absolute territorial protection
has been established. Grundig's export prohibition on each of its exclu-
sive dealers, in combination with Consten's enforcement of its trademark
rights to prevent other Grundig dealers from exporting to France, re-
moved any possibility of parallel imports. The effect of this absolute ter-
ritorial protection was to create separate national markets within the
EEC and to insulate the French market for Grundig products from in-
trabrand competition. The Court held that this constituted a distortion
of competition and thus violated Article 85(1). 18
Further aspects of the Common Market law on exclusive distribu-
tion agreements are to be found in Sociele Technique Mniere v. Maschzinenbau
Ulm G.m.b.H. 19 In that case, the Court of Justice provided a methodol-
ogy for analyzing the legality of these agreements, stating that exclusive
distribution agreements "do . . .not automatically come under the pro-
hibition of Article 85, paragraph 1.1"20 An analysis of each of the ele-
ments of Article 85(1) is necessary to determine whether an agreement
violates that Article. A distribution agreement between enterprises falls
within the prohibition of Article 85(1) if it meets two criteria. First, it
must be "liable to affect trade between Member States."'z This provi-
sion requires that before there can be liability under Article 85(1) there
must be "a possibility that the realization of a single market between
Member States may be hindered."122 The agreement must contain provi-
sions that create a "partitioning" of the market and thus frustrate "eco-
nomic interpenetration," which is the goal of the Common Market. 23
17 Id
18 Id. at 7653.
19 1966 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 235, [1961-1966 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP.
(CCH) 8047.
20 Id at 7695.
21 Treaty of Rome (EEC) Article 85(i), supra note 7.
22 Societe Technique Miniere, [1961-1966 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH)
at 7695. See also S.A. Cadillon v. Hoss, 1971 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 351, [1971-1973 Transfer
Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8135; Beguelin Import Co. v. G.L. Import Export S.A.,
1971 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 949, [1971-1973 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH)
8149.
23 Societe Technique Miniere, [1961-1966 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH)
at 7696.
1984]
N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
Second, there is a violation of 85(1) only if the agreement has either the
object or the effect of impairing competition within the Common Mar-
ket.24 Whether there is an impairment of competition depends on sev-
eral market factors, including the nature and availability of the products,
the size of the parties and their ability to have an impact on the market,
the extent to which the contract is isolated, and the degree to which the
exclusivity restrictions provide territorial protection. 25
Clearly, restrictions on competition that appear in the text of the
agreement fall within the prohibitions of Article 85(1).26 The Court or
the Commission, however, may look beyond the agreement itself to the
factual circumstances surrounding the agreement. The existence of simi-
lar agreements between the same producer and distributors in other
Member States may be probative. 27 Similarly, an impairment to compe-
tition may arise from the combined effect of the exclusive agreement and
the operation of certain national laws.
28
These principles apply to exclusive purchasing agreements as well as
exclusive supply agreements. The typical exclusive purchasing agree-
ment requires the purchaser to obtain the contract goods exclusively
from one supplier for a certain period of time. One obvious anticompeti-
tive effect of such agreements is that they foreclose the supplier's compet-
itors from selling to that purchaser for the duration of the agreement.
29
Nevertheless, the Commission has recognized that these agreements pro-
vide an important business function by assuring a market for sales by the
supplier and assuring a source of supply for the purchaser. 30 Purchasing
agreements should be analyzed within the legal and economic context in
which they occur. Thus, if a single purchasing agreement is part of an
entire network of agreements that have a cumulative effect on competi-
tion, the existence of the other contracts will be taken into consideration
in determining whether the single contract violates Article 85(1).31
24 Id.; Cadillon, [1971-1973 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) at 7542; Begue-
ln, [1971-1973 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) at 7704.
25 Societe Technique Miniere, [1961-1966 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH)
at 7696. It has been noted that these market analysis tests are "not unlike those used ... under
the Rule of Reason." RAHL, COMMON MARKET AND AMERICAN ANTITRUST 213 (1970).
26 Beguelh, [1971-1973 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) at 7704-06.
27 Societe Technique Miniere [1961-1966 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH)
at 7696; Public Prosecutor v. Dassonville, 1974 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 838, [1975 Transfer
Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8276.
28 In Dassonvi/le, the Court of Justice held that an exclusive distribution agreement in
combination with a national law concerning proof of authenticity in the designation of origin of
certain products could fall within the prohibition of Article 85(1) if used to prevent parallel
imports. The Court added that a provision in an agreement that merely authorizes a distribu-
tor from exploiting a national rule, or does not prohibit him from doing so, does not suffice, in
itself, to render the agreement null and void.
29 HAWK, supra note 5, at 597.
30 EEC Seventh Report on Competition Policy 23 (1978).
31 S.A. Brasserie de Haecht v. Consorts Wilkin-Janssen, 1967 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 407,
[1967-1970 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8053; Alexis de Norre v. Brouwerij
Concordia, 1977 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 295 [1975 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH)
8386.
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American and other non-EEC exporters should be aware that the
fact that they are domiciled outside the Common Market does not insu-
late them from the application of Article 85(1) if they are party to a
distribution agreement under which their goods are distributed within
the Common Market.
32
There is one situation in which an exclusive distribution agreement
does not fall within the ambit of Article 85(1), even though the agree-
ment may provide for absolute territorial protection. The Court of Jus-
tice announced in Volk v. Vervaecke 33 that if the parties to the agreement
are small, and the effect on the market would be imperceptible, the
agreement is not "likely to affect trade between Member States" and
thus does not violate Article 85(1). 3 4 These agreements in no way jeop-
ardize the goal of market integration in the EEC. Though the Court of
Justice provided no concrete criteria for determining when an agreement
is too small to be of concern under the competition laws of the EEC, the
Commission has since provided guidelines in its Notice Concerning Mi-
nor Agreements.
35
II. Origin and Development of the Group Exemption for Exclusive
Distribution Agreements
Article 85(3)36 of the Rome Treaty provides that any "agreement"
or "concerted practice" or any "category" of agreements or concerted
practices can be declared exempt from the application of Article 85(1) if
certain conditions are met. To be eligible for an exemption, an agree-
ment or concerted practice must meet four conditions: 1) it must im-
prove the production or distribution of goods or promote technical or
economic progress; 2) it must allow consumers a fair share of the result-
ing benefit; 3) it can contain only those restrictions that are indispensable
to the attainment of these objectives; and 4) it must not afford the parties
the possibility of eliminating competition with respect to a substantial
part of the products in question. 37 The same conditions must be met in
order for a category of agreements or concerted practices to obtain an
exemption.
In 1962, the Council of the EEC issued Regulation 17/62 (Regula-
32 Beguein, [1971-1973 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) at 7704.
33 1969 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 295, [1967-1970 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP.
(CCH) 8074.
34 See also Cadtl/on, [1971-1973 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8135.
35 Commission Notice of December 19, 1977 Concerning Agreements of Minor Impor-
tance Which Do Not Fall Under Article 85(1) of the Treaty Establishing The European Eco-
nomic Community, I COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 2700. The Notice is not binding on the
Court of Justice, and the Commission itself has stated that the Notice is "for guidance purposes
only." Commission Decision of July 24, 1974 (Advocaat Zwarte Kip), [1973-1975 Transfer
Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 9669. See Osterweil, Developing EECAntitrust Law in the
Field of Distributzon under Article 85ofthe Treaty of Rome, 8 LAw & POL. INT'L Bus. 77, 81-82 (1976).
36 Treaty of Rome Article 85(3), supra note 7.
37 Id
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tion 17),38 the first Regulation implementing Articles 85 and 86 of the
Treaty. Although Regulation 17 established a procedure for parties ap-
plying to the Commission for an exemption under Article 85(3), it pro-
vided no means for the Commission to issue group exemptions. Shortly
after Regulation 17 came into force, the Commission was inundated with
applications for exemptions under Article 85(3), a large percentage of
which were distribution agreements. 39 The Commission attempted to es-
tablish certain group exemptions as one means of dealing with some of
the more than 34,000 agreements notified in 1962.40 The Commission,
however, held off when the Advisory Committee on Restrictive Practices
and Monopolies expressed the opinion that Regulation 17 did not give
the Commission any legal basis for issuing group exemptions. 4 1 Repre-
sentatives of the Member States on the Council argued that only the
Council, not the Commission, had the authority to grant group exemp-
tions.42 In response to this limitation on its authority, the Commission
issued a regulation creating a simplified form for notifying exclusive dis-
tribution agreements. 43 The Commission received approximately 12,000
notifications on the simplified form. 44
Finally, in 1965, the Council of Ministers issued Regulation 19/65, 45
which authorized the Commission to grant group exemptions for exclu-
sive supply and purchasing agreements and for agreements involving the
assignment or licensing of industrial property rights. Regulation 19/65
merely establishes a framework for issuing group exemptions and leaves
to the Commission the function of specifying the particular conditions an
agreement must fulfill to qualify for a group exemption. 46
The Commission did not immediately issue a group exemption for
exclusive distribution agreements. Rather, in accordance with Regula-
tion 19/65, it waited until "sufficient experience ha[d] been gained in the
light of individual decisions."'4 7 It granted individual exemptions to sev-
38 Regulation 17/62 of February 6, 1962, 1 COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 2401-2634.
39 Hahn, Exclusive Distributorship Agreements in the European Common Market, 16 AM. U. L.
REV. 367, 371 (1967).
40 See Dam, Exclusive Distributorships in the United States and the European Economic Community,
16 ANTITRUST BULL. 111, 125 (1971); Note, Emergence of Group Exemptions Within the EEC Policy
on Competition, 6 VA. J. INT'L L. 128, 135 (1965); Cohen, The Application of Article 85(3) of the
Treaty Estabhhtng the European Economic Community to Exclusive Dealing Agreements, 54 CORNELL L.
REV. 379, 389 (1969).
41 1 COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 2726 at 1875.
42 See Note, supra note 40, at 135; Cohen, supra note 40, at 390.
43 Regulation 153/62, 5 J. Off. Com. Eur. 2918 (1962). See Note, supra note 40, at 136.
44 Hahn, supra note 39, at 372; Cohen, supra note 40, at 3.
45 Regulation 19/65, 1 COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 2717.
46 Republic of Italy v. Council and Commission of the EEC, [1961-1966 Transfer Binder]
COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8048 at 7718. The Government of Italy brought a suit seeking
the annulment of Regulation 19/65. The Court of Justice upheld the Regulation, holding that
the Council could exempt by Regulation specific groups of agreements without violating Article
87 of the Treaty and without derogating from the principles of Article 85(1).
47 Preamble to Regulation 19/65, 1 COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 2717 at 1871.
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eral distribution agreements48 and waited until the Court of Justice ruled
on Grundig-Consten, since that case would have a major impact on Com-
mon Market competition law.
In 1967, the long-awaited group exemption for exclusive distribu-
tion agreements arrived when the Commission issued Regulation 67/67.
The Commission felt that it had gained sufficient experience to be able
"to define a first category of agreements and concerted practices, which
can be accepted as normally satisfying the conditions laid down in Arti-
cle 85(3)." 4 9
Although Regulation 67/67 was "designed to promote legal cer-
tainty," 50 there were shortcomings in the drafting that were not recog-
nized immediately. When the Regulation was scheduled to expire after
having been in force for five years, the Commission extended it for an-
other ten years, 5 1 finding it to be "satisfactory" and effective in promot-
ing trade and preventing the creation of economic barriers by means of
absolute territorial protection.5 2 Within four years after extending it,
however, the Commission began to consider amending the Regulation. 53
Amendments were needed in several respects. Regulation 67/67
contained certain gaps, particularly concerning exclusive purchasing ar-
rangements and distribution agreements between competitors. Certain
terms in the Regulation were too imprecise, thus permitting misuse of the
block exemption and failing to provide the guidance that the Regulation
was designed to provide. In addition, amendments to some provisions
were necessary to effectuate policy changes, to strengthen certain points,
and to conform the language of the Regulation to rulings of the Euro-
pean Court of Justice.
The amendment process took almost seven years. What began as an
effort to quickly enact some narrow amendments evolved into a complete
recasting of the Regulation. 54 In 1980, four years after Regulation 67/67
amendments were initially considered, the Commission began referring
to the "replacement, ' 55 rather than the amendment of the regulation,
which was to expire at the end of 1982. The Commission published sev-
eral drafts of the proposed Regulation and entertained comments from
the business and legal communities. By the end of 1982, consideration of
the new block exemption was still not complete, so Regulation 67/67 was
extended for six more months.56 In June, 1983, the Commission pub-
lished Regulations 1983/83 and 1984/83, both of which became effective
48 See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
49 Regulation 67/67, supra note 9.
50 Alexis de Norre v. N.V. Brouwerij Concordia, [1976 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT.
REP. (CCH) 8386 at 7942.
51 Regulation 2591/72, 0. J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 276) (1972).
52 EEC Second Report on Competition Policy 18 (1973).
53 EEC Sixth Report on Competition Policy 19 (1977).
54 EEC Ninth Report on Competition Policy 16 (1980).
55 EEC Tenth Report on Competition Policy 15 (1981).
56 Regulation 3577/82, 25 0. J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 373) 58 (1982).
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July 1, 1983. Six months later, the Commission issued a "Notice Con-
cerning Regulations No. 1983/83 and No. 1984/83" in order to provide
"interpretive guidance" on the new regulations and to assist companies
in "bringing their agreements into line with the new legal
requirements.
57
III. Operation of the New Group Exemptions for Exclusive Dealing
A. Legal Basis for the Group Exemptions
In the recitals accompanying Regulations 1983/83 and 1984/83,
which were largely carried over from the recitals in Regulation 67/67,
the Commission explained why it considers certain exclusive distribution
agreements to fulfill the conditions of Article 85(3).58 The Commission
stated several reasons why these agreements improve distribution. Ex-
clusive arrangements allow manufacturers to concentrate sales activities
by reducing the number of dealers with whom the manufacturers must
do business. This reduces problems arising out of "linguistic, legal, and
other differences," which could be substantial among the several coun-
tries of the Common Market. 59 In addition, exclusive distribution agree-
ments permit more intensive and orderly marketing and customer
service.6° The Commission noted that exclusive distribution agreements
"stimulate competition between the products of different manufactur-
ers," ie., interbrand competition. 6 1 It also noted that these agreements
are often the sole means by which small and medium-sized companies
can enter a market, 62 implicitly recognizing the reality that absent a
guarantee of exclusivity for a defined area, a distributor will be reluctant
to undertake the expense of marketing, promoting, and servicing a prod-
uct. Small manufacturers may not have sufficient assets to perform these
functions on a broad scale and may be foreclosed from certain geo-
graphic markets unless they can be assured of some degree of exclusivity.
The Commission also maintains that consumers will benefit directly
from these improvements in distribution 6 3 and that exclusive distribu-
tion agreements will not prevent competition in a substantial part of the
market due to the availability of parallel imports. 64 The restrictive pro-
visions permitted by the new Regulation are necessary to attain the im-
provements in distribution mentioned above, since the restrictions have
57 3 COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 10,548 at 11,268.
58 The recitals have often been relied upon by the Court of Justice in its interpretation of
Regulation 67/67. gee,e.g., Van Vliet v. Fratelli Dalle Crode, 1975 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1103,
[1975 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8314 at 7664; S.A. Fonderies Roubaix
Wattrelos v. Societe Novelle des Fonderies A. Roux, 1976 E. Comm. Ct. J. I1l [1976 Transfer
Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8341 at 7212.
59 Regulation 1983/83, 25 0. J. EUR. COMM. (Supp.) 10 (1983).
60 Id at 11.
61 Id This point was not contained in the recitals in Regulation 67/67.
62 Id.
63 Id at 12.
64 Id at 16.
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the beneficial effects of producing a clear division of functions between
the manufacturers and the distributor, and of forcing the distributor to
concentrate his efforts on the contract goods in the contract territory. 65
Exclusive purchasing agreements improve distribution by enabling the
supplier to plan more effectively the sales of his goods, and by insuring
the reseller a reliable source of supply.66
B. Scope of the Exemptions
Regulation 67/67 covered both exclusive distribution agreements
and exclusive purchasing agreements, but that coverage has now been
separated into two regulations. Regulation 1983/83 covers distribution
agreements, and Regulation 1984/83 covers purchasing agreements,
which raise quite different issues than distribution agreements.
The basic scope of the group exemption for exclusive distribution
agreements is set forth in Article 1 of Regulation 1983/83,67 which pro-
vides that Article 85(1) does not apply to agreements in which one party
agrees to supply exclusively to another party goods for resale within a
defined area of the Common Market, or within the whole Common Mar-
ket. Agreements for the supply of goods which the purchaser transforms
or processes into other goods are not considered to be agreements for
resale. 68 The exemption covers only the resale of goods and does not
extend to services.69 The agreement must be bilateral, not multilateral,
and the distribution arrangement must be exclusive. If more than one
distributor is authorized for a single defined area, the exemption does not
apply.
7°
Regulation 1983/83 contains two important departures from Regu-
lation 67/67 concerning the basic coverage of the exemption. The first is
that under Regulation 1983/83, an exclusive distribution agreement may
designate the entire Common Market as the exclusive territory of the sole
distributor. 71 Regulation 67/67 permitted the agreements to cover only
65 Id. at 13.
66 Id at 20.
67 Id. at 1. Article I of Regulation 1983/83 provides: "Pursuant to Article 85(3) of the
Treaty and subject to the provisions of this regulation, it is hereby declared that Article 85(1) of
the Treaty shall not apply to agreements to which only two undertakings are party and whereby
one party agrees with the other to supply certain goods for resale within the whole or a defined
area of the common market only to that other.
68 Notice Concerning Regulations No. 1983/83 and 1984/83, 3 COMMON MKT. REP.
(CCH) 10,548 at 11,269. The Commission has also indicated that when a distributor performs
additional operations to add value to the goods, the determination on whether the agreement
continues to be one for resale will depend upon the amount of value added and whether the
"economic identity" of the goods has been changed. Id.
69 Commission Decision of May 26, 1978, [1978-1981 Transfer Binder COMMON MKT.
REP. (CCH) 9912.
70 Commission Decision of December 21, 1976 (Junghans), [1976-1978 Transfer Binder]
COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 9912.
71 Regulation 1983/83, supra note 67.
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"a defined area of the common market."' 72 Manufacturers abused the
block exemption by appointing sole distributors for the entire Common
Market with the exception of one small country. 73 The Commission felt
that although the agreement came within the literal application of Regu-
lation 67/67, it violated the spirit of the Regulation, which was intended
to permit group exemptions only for agreements covering a part of the
Common Market. 74 The Commission has expressed the view that exclu-
sive distribution agreements covering all or almost all of the Common
Market would reduce the possibility of parallel imports and thereby im-
pair intrabrand competition. 75 In 1977, in one of its draft amendments
to Regulation 67/67, the Commission proposed that the territory covered
by the agreement could not exceed 100 million in population unless par-
allel imports were available from at least three alternative sources within
the Common Market. 76 This approach of defining the territory in terms
of population was subsequently abandoned, and the Commission ulti-
mately changed its position on the issue completely. By 1981, the Com-
mission was of the view that agreements covering the entire market
should be within the scope of the group exemption. 77 The Commission
does not elaborate on this change of policy in its Reports on Competition
Policy, but may have felt that other provisions of Regulation 1983/83
insure the possibility of parallel imports sufficiently to permit the
broader scope for the group exemption.
The second change in the scope of the group exemption is that it
may apply to purely domestic agreements, which are agreements involv-
ing the resale of goods within a Member State between parties from the
same state. Article 1(2) of Regulation 67/67 expressly provided that the
group exemption did not apply under those circumstances. This led to
the anomalous situation that a domestic agreement, even if it did affect
trade between Member States, could not qualify for the group exemp-
tion, but the same agreement entered into between parties from different
Member States would be exempt.7 The Court of Justice rectified this
anomaly in Roubaix v. Roux,79 in which it held that Article 1(2) of Regula-
tion 67/67 was not intended to deprive domestic agreements of the bene-
fit of the group exemption as long as all the other conditions of the
72 Regulation 67/67,supra note 9. See, Commission Decision of December 19, 1974, [1973-
1975 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) $ 9708A.
73 EEC Sixth Report on Competition Policy 20 (1977). See also U.P. TOEPKE, EEC COM-
PETITION LAW 315 (1982) ("It would seem sufficient for securing the benefits of Regulation
67/67 for the parties to exclude from their agreement the territory of one Member State, for
example Luxembourg").
74 EEC Sixth Report on Competition Policy 20 (1977).
75 EEC Ninth Report on Competition Policy 16 (1980).
76 EEC Seventh Report on Competition Policy 55 (1978).
77 EEC Eleventh Report on Competition Policy 23 (1982).
78 Commission Decision of December 19, 1974 (Goodyear Italiana-Euran) [1973-1975
Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 9708 at 9570. See EEC Fourth Report on
Competition Policy 61 (1975).
79 [1976 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) $ 8341.
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Regulation were satisfied.80 To conform the new Regulation to the prin-
ciple laid down in Roubaix, the Commission simply deleted the provision
that the exemption was not applicable to purely domestic transactions.8
This change in the Regulation will enhance the certainty of the parties
concerning the exemption, and will, in some situations, dispense with the
necessity of resolving the difficult question whether a domestic agree-
ment significantly affects trade with Member States.
C Permissible Restrictions in Exclusive Distribution Agreements
Article 2 of Regulation 1983/83 identifies several restrictive clauses
that an exclusive distribution agreement can contain and still qualify for
the group exemption. To be eligible for the exemption, however, a distri-
bution agreement can contain no restrictions other than the restrictions
specified in Article 2.82 Although Article 2 of the new Regulation covers
basically the same concepts as those covered in its predecessor, it adds a
measure of precision that should clarify the applicability of the
exemption.
Unlike Regulation 67/67, which only dealt with restrictions im-
posed on the distributor, Regulation 1983/83 recognizes that anticompe-
titive restrictions on the manufacturer sometimes appear in distribution
agreements. Thus, Article 2(1) of Regulation 1983/83 provides that "no
restriction on competition shall be imposed on the supplier other than
the obligation not to supply the contract goods to users in the contract
territory." This permits the exclusive distribution agreement to contain
a clause prohibiting the manufacturer from supplying directly to con-
80 See also Alexis de Norre v. N.V. Brouwerij Concordia, [1976 Transfer Binder] COMMON
MKT. REP. (CCH) $ 8386.
81 See Regulation 1983/83, supra, note 59, at 8, where the Commission states that where
such agreements affect trade Member States "there is no reason to withhold from them the
benefit of the exemption by category."
82 Id. at 3. Regulation 1983/83, Article 2 provides:
I. Apart from the obligation referred to in Article 1, no restriction on com-
petition shall be imposed on the supplier other than the obligation not to supply
the contract goods to users in the contract territory.
2. No restriction on competition shall be imposed on the exclusive distribu-
tor other than:
(a) the obligation not to manufacture or distribute goods which compete
with the contract goods;
(b) the obligation to obtain the contract goods for resale only from the
other party;
(c) the obligation to refrain, outside the contract territory and in relation to
the contract goods, from seeking customers, from establishing any branch, and
from maintaining any distribution depot.
3. Article 1 shall apply notwithstanding that the exclusive distributor un-
dertakes all or any of the following obligations:
(a) to purchase complete ranges of goods or minimum quantities;
(b) to sell the contract goods under trademarks, or packed and presented as
specified by the other party;
(c) to take measures for promotion of sales, in particular:
-to advertise, -to maintain a sales network or stock of goods, -to provide
customer and guarantee services, -to employ staff having specialized or technical
training.
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sumers in the contract area and thus competing with the exclusive dis-
tributor in that area. This type of clause contributes to the "division of
functions" referred to in the recitals in the preamble of the regulation. 83
Article 2(2) describes a series of restrictions that can be imposed on
the exclusive distributor, and Article 2(3) discusses certain permissible
obligations by the distributor that do not constitute restrictions on com-
petition. These paragraphs constitute the heart of the group exemption
in that they define for the parties exactly which provisions circumscrib-
ing the conduct of the distributor can be included in the agreement.
Under Article 2(2), the distributor can be prohibited from manufactur-
ing or distributing goods that compete with the manufacturer's goods
being distributed under the contract. This paragraph eliminates a provi-
sion of Regulation 67/6784 that allowed this prohibition not only for the
duration of the contract, but also for one year after its expiration. The
effect of this change is that a noncompetition clause that extends beyond
the duration of the distribution agreement will not be eligible for the
group exemption.8 5 The agreement can also restrict the distributor's
source of supply by requiring the distributor to obtain goods for resale
only from the manufacturer rather than from another distributor.8 6
Article 2(2)(c) of Regulation 1983/83 permits a restriction of great
practical importance. Although any prohibition of sales outside the con-
tract territory would be strictly forbidden under Article 85(1)87 and
would not normally qualify for an exemption under Article 85(3), Article
2 (2)(c) sanctions certain limitations that have the effect of discouraging
sales outside the designated territory. This provision, carried over from
Regulation 67/67, allows a contract clause that requires the distributor
to refrain from actively seeking customers outside the contract territory,
or from setting up a branch or distribution depot outside the territory.
This affords the possibility of some degree of territorial protection with-
out going so far as to permit absolute protection. Neither the Commis-
sion nor the Court of Justice has been called upon to provide an
interpretation of this provision. The permissibility of a "profit passover"
clause, under which a distributor pays a certain amount on sales outside
his territory to the distributor in whose territory the sale has been made
83 See supra text accompanying note 65.
84 Regulation 67/67, art. 2(1)(a), supra note 9.
85 See 8th Recital of Regulation 1983/83, 25 0. J. EUR. COMM. (Supp.) 13 (1967), which
indicates that the restrictions of Article 2 are permissible only when they are limited to the
duration of the agreement.
86 The 1982 draft of this provision limited this exclusive supply obligation to a period of
three years. 3 COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 10,406, Article 2(2)(b). This provision was
dropped from the final version of the Regulation, so this obligation may presumably extend for
the entire duration of the distribution agreement.
87 See, e.g., Ets. Consten and Grundig-Verkaufs G.m.b.H. v. EEC Commission, [1961-1966
Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) $ 8046; Miller International Schallplatten v.
EEC Commission, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8439; Commis-
sion Decision of July 11, 1983 (Windsurfing International), 3 COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH)
10,515.
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has also been left unaddressed. The purpose of the clauses is to compen-
sate the nonselling distributor for expenses of advertising and after-sale
service. If the clauses are used fairly and not for purposes of penalizing
extraterritorial sales, they would not appear to preclude application of
the group exemption. 88
Under Article 2(3) of Regulation 1983/83, a manufacturer can re-
quire a distributor to purchase the manufacturer's full line, or minimum
quantities of goods. It can also specify how the distributor must mark or
package the goods. Finally, the manufacturer can require the distributor
to engage in certain promotional efforts such as advertising, maintaining
an inventory, maintaining a trained sales force, and providing customer
and guarantee services in the contract territory.
It is important to understand that the restrictions specified in Article
2 are the only restrictions that can be contained in an exclusive distribu-
tion agreement if it is to qualify for the group exemption.8 9 Numerous
agreements have been rendered invalid because they impose additional
anticompetitive restrictions, such as export bans or clauses fixing resale
prices.90
D. Restrictions Expressl Prohibited
The permissible restrictions of Article 2 are counterbalanced by sev-
eral limitations itemized in Article 3 of Regulation 1983/83.91 Article 3
88 See HAWK, supra note 5, at 138-39 (Supp. 1980).
89 The Commission has emphasized this point by adding language to the recitals that did
not appear in the recitals for Regulation 67/67. The 8th recital now states "further restrictive
obligations and jn particular those which limit the exclusive distributor's choice of customers or
his freedom to determine his prices and conditions of sale cannot be exempted under this regula-
tion." I COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 2730 at 1892.
90 See, e.g., Begueh/, [1971-1973 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8149 (re-
export prohibition); Commission Decision ofJuly 11, 1983 (Windsurfing International), 3 COM-
MON MKT. REP. (CCH) 10,515 (resale restrictions); Commission Decision of December 11,
1980 (Hennessy-Henkel), [1978-1981 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 10,283
(resale price fixing); Commission Decision of December 21, 1977 (Spice Distribution), [1976-
1977 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 10,017 (resale price fixing).
91 Regulation 1983/83, art. 3, 25 O.J. Euk. COMM. (Supp.) 10 (1983) provides:
Article 1 shall not apply where:
(a) manufacturers of identical goods or of goods which are considered by
users as equivalent in view of their characteristics, price and intended use enter
into reciprocal exclusive distribution agreements between themselves in respect of
such goods;
(b) manufacturers of identical goods or of goods which are considered by
users as equivalent in view of their characteristics, price and intended use enter
into a non-reciprocal exclusive distribution agreement between themselves in re-
spect of such goods unless at least one of them has a total annual turnover of no
more than 100 million ECU;
(c) users can obtain the contract goods in the contract territory only from
the exclusive distributor and have no alternative source of supply outside the con-
tract territory;
(d) one or both of the parties makes it difficult for intermediaries or users to
obtain the contract goods from other dealers inside the common market or, in so
far as no alternative source of supply is available there, from outside the common
market, in particular where one or both of them:
1. exercises industrial property rights so as to prevent dealers or users from
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contains much that is new and fills some gaps that existed in Regulation
67/67.
1. Agreements Between Competitors
One matter that is more carefully controlled under the new Regula-
tion is the problem of agreements between competing manufacturers.
Regulation 67/67 provided that exclusive agreements between competi-
tors could not qualify for the group exemption, but the prohibition, by
its terms, extended only to reciprocal horizontal agreements. 92 In addi-
tion, nothing in Regulation 67/67 prohibited an exclusive distribution
agreement between a manufacturer and a subsidiary of a competing
manufacturer, nor did the Regulation define exactly what was meant by
"competing goods." These defects have all been addressed by Regula-
tion 1983/83.
The new Regulation draws a distinction between reciprocal and
nonreciprocal exclusive distribution agreements between competitors. 9 3
Reciprocal agreements are excluded from the group exemption.9 4 Their
anticompetitive characteristics are obvious - they present a risk of hori-
zontal market division, which is expressly prohibited by Article 85(l). 95
A nonreciprocal agreement by a manufacturer to distribute its goods
through a competitor, a situation not addressed in Regulation 67/67, can
be equally anticompetitive96 and is now expressly prohibited for larger
companies. 97 The Commission, however, has recognized that in some
industries a competing manufacturer may be the only available outlet
for small or medium-sized companies. Thus, the new Regulation permits
competing manufacturers to enter reciprocal exclusive distribution
agreements if one or both of the parties has an annual turnover of no
more than 100 million E.C.U.98
The new Regulation also forecloses the possibility of circumventing,
through the use of subsidiaries, the prohibition on horizontal agreements.
Article 4 of Regulation 1983/83 provides that the limitations on distribu-
obtaining outside, or from selling in, the contract territory properly marked or
otherwise properly marketed contract goods:
2. exercises other rights or takes other measures so as to prevent dealers or
users from obtaining outside, or from selling in, the contract territory contract
goods.
92 Regulation 67/67, art. 3(a), supra note 9, provides that the exemption does not apply
where "manufacturers of competing goods entrust each other with exclusive dealing in those
goods."
93 One commentator noted the failure of Regulation 67/67 to make this distinction shortly
after its issuance. See Champaud, supra note 4, at 33.
94 Regulation 1983/83, art. 3(a), supra note 91.
95 See supra note 7.
96 See Champaud, supra note 4, at 33.
97 Regulation 1983/83, art. 3(b),supra note 91. Of course, such companies are still free to
seek an exemption under Article 85(3).
98 Id. An ECU (European Currency Unit) is a unit of account whose equivalent in na-
tional currencies is regularly determined by the Commission and published in the Official Jour-
nal of the European Communities.
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tion through a competitor also apply when the competing goods are
manufactured not by the party to the distribution agreement but by a
"connected undertaking." 99 Thus, if a large manufacturer enters an
agreement with a distributor whose parent company is also a large man-
ufacturer of competing goods, the agreement would not qualify for the
group exemption.
The Commission has also defined more precisely the concept of
"competing goods," replacing that term with the phrase "identical goods
or. . . goods which are considered by users as equivalent in view of their
characteristics, price and intended use." 10 0 Although the attempt at
greater specificity is to be commended, the new term will probably not
markedly increase the certainty as to which goods come within the mean-
ing of Article 3 of the Regulation.
2. Absolute Territorial Protection
The new Regulation has strengthened the prohibition against abso-
lute territorial protection. Regulation 67/67 recognized in its recitals the
importance of parallel imports and the problem of absolute territorial
protection,' 0 but the body of the Regulation did not expressly state that
the exemption would be inapplicable in situations when there was abso-
lute territorial protection. The Commission has now attempted to fortify
the prohibition against absolute territorial protection by adding an ex-
press prohibition to Article 3 of Regulation 1983/83. Article 3(c) pro-
vides that the group exemption does not apply when the exclusive
distributor is the sole source of supply of the contract goods in the terri-
tory and there is no alternative source of the goods outside the terri-
tory.102 If, because of the specialized nature of the contract goods,
competing distributors in the territory are unable to obtain the goods
through parallel imports, and the user is unable to obtain the goods
99 The language of Article 4 is tortuous at best and verges on the incomprehensible. It
states:
1. Article 3(a) and (b) shall also apply where the goods there referred to are
manufactured by an undertaking connected with a party to the agreement.
2. Connected undertakings are:
(a) undertakings in which a party to the agreement, directly or indirectly:
- owns more then half of the capital or business assets, or
- has the power to exercise more than half the voting rights, or
- has the power to appoint more than half the members of the supervisory
board, board of directors or bodies legally representing the undertaking, or
- has the right to manage the affairs;
(b) undertakings which directly or indirectly have in or over a party to the
agreement the rights or powers listed in (a);
(c) undertakings in which an undertaking referred to in (b) directly or indi-
rectly has the rights or powers listed in (a).
3. Undertakings in which the parties to the agreement or undertakings con-
nected with them jointly have the rights or powers set out in paragraph 2(a) shall
be considered to be connected with each of the parties to the agreement.
100 Regulation 1983/83, supra note 91.
101 10 0. J. EUR. COMM. 645 (1967).
102 Regulation 1983/83, supra note 91.
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through sources outside the territory, then the exclusive distribution
agreement will have to be individually submitted to the Commission to
obtain an exemption. Questions will arise whether the phrase "no alter-
native source of supply outside the contract territory"103 means that im-
portation must be literally impossible, or whether this phrase would
cover situations when importation is impracticable due to the nature of
the product or the costs of shipment. If the latter interpretation is
adopted, it could seriously undercut the new provision in Article 1 that
permits exclusive distribution agreements to cover the entire Common
Market, since the alternative of importing from non-Common Market
countries may be unduly expensive. The Commission has provided some
guidance on the interpretation of this clause by noting that the supplier
itself may constitute an alternative source of supply if the supplier is pre-
pared to sell to end-users in the contract territory.'
0 4
3. Agreements Impairing the Distrbution of Goods
Regulation 67/67 contained a catch-all prohibition' 0 5 on which the
Commission and the Court of Justice frequently relied to exclude agree-
ments from the exemption when the parties took actions designed to pro-
tect the contract territory or otherwise prohibit parallel imports. 10 6 The
provision extended to conduct that was outside the written terms of the
distribution agreements and applied to unilateral as well as concerted
activity.' 0 7 This provision has now been carried over into Article 3(d) of
Regulation 1983/83,108 which reflects essentially the same concepts as
contained in its predecessor, but adds a provision with respect to restric-
tions on goods from dealers outside the Common Market.
Article 3(d) provides that the group exemption is not applicable
when the parties to the exclusive distribution agreement "make it diffi-
cult" for users to obtain the goods from other dealers. In Regulation
67/67 this provision related only to difficulty in obtaining goods from
other dealers "within the common market."' 0 9 Regulation 1983/83 ex-
pands the prohibition to cover situations involving difficulty in obtaining
103 Id.
104 Notice Concerning Regulations No. 1983/83 and 1984/83, 3 COMMON MKT. REP.
(CCH) 10,548 at 11,272.
105 Regulation 67/67, art. 3(b), supra note 9.
106 See Beguehn, [1971-1973 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8135; Van
Vliet v. Fratelli Dalle Crode, [1975 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8314; Com-
mission Decision of December 2, 1981 (Hasselblad), 3 COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 10,401;
Commission Decision of December 11, 1980 (Hennessy-Henkel), [1978-1981 Transfer Binder]
COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 10,283; Commission Decision of December 21, 1976
(Theal/Watts), [1976-1978 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 9913.
107 Commission Decision of November 16, 1983 (Ford Werke AG), 3 COMMON MKT. REP.
(CCH) 10,539; Commission Decision of December 2, 1981 (Hasselblad), 3 COMMON MKT.
REP. (CCH) 10,401.
108 Regulation 1983/83, supra note 91; Regulation 67/67, supra note 9.
109 Regulation 1983/83, art. 3(b), supra note 91.
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goods from outside the Common Market when no alternative source of
supply is available within the Common Market.
In addition to the general prohibition on actions that make distribu-
tion difficult, Article 3(d) recites two types of conduct that will deprive
the parties of the benefit of an exemption. First, industrial property
rights cannot be used to create territorial barriers.1 10 Second, in an ex-
tremely open-ended provision, the parties are prohibited from exercising
"other rights" or taking "other measures" that would prevent dealers
from selling, or consumers from using, the contract goods in the
territory. I I,
Inherent in these provisions is a degree of tension between EEC
competition law and national laws protecting industrial property rights
or prohibiting unfair competition. A balance was struck in Begue/in Im-
port Co. v. GL. Import Export SA. ,12 in which the Court of Justice held
that an exclusive distribution agreement, used in combination with na-
tional laws on unfair competition to prevent parallel imports, cannot
benefit from the protection of the group exemption. The Court stated
that a party to an exclusive distribution agreement can exercise its rights
under national law "only if the allegedly unfair conduct of his competi-
tion results from circumstances other than the mere fact that they en-
gaged in parallel imports."' 13
E. Exclusive Purchasing Agreements
Exclusive purchasing arrangements are now covered by Regulation
1984/83. The concepts covered in this Regulation differ greatly from the
coverage of exclusive purchasing agreements in Regulation 67/67. Reg-
ulation 67/67 was seriously deficient in addressing the issues raised by
exclusive purchasing agreements because, as the Commission has recog-
nized, Regulation 67/67 was "tailored for exclusive distribution
agreements."' 1
4
Most exclusive purchasing agreements in the Common Market are
between parties within the same Member State, and the Commission ini-
tially did not consider these agreements to be covered by Regulation
67/67. The Commission also felt that Regulation 67/67 was inapplica-
ble to purchasing agreements that did not define an area of the Common
Market within which resale was to take place."t 5 Exclusive purchasing
110 Id. at art. 3(d)(1).
III Id. at art. 3(d)(2).
112 [1971-1973 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) $ 8135.
13 Id at 7704. See also Sirena v. Eda, [1971-1973 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP.
(CCH) 8101.
114 EEC Seventh Report on Competition Policy 54 (1978). See also Commission's Response
to Written Question No. 1764/82, 3 COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 10,478 at 11,069 ("There is
no provision whatsoever in the regulation [67/67] dealing with the problems specific to exclu-
sive purchasing agreements").
115 Alexis de Norre v. N.V. Brouwerij Concordia, [1976 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT.
REP. (CCH) 8386.
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agreements are most often part of a network of agreements found in dis-
tinct industries (e.g. , the brewing industry and the petroleum products
industry), and frequently contain provisions concerning the extension of
credit and the leasing of premises."16 Regulation 67/67 was not designed
with any of these peculiarities in mind. Nevertheless, in 1977 the Court
of Justice, in Alexis de Norre v. Brouwery'' Concordia ,117 held that the group
exemption provided in Regulation 67/67 extended to these types of
agreements.
The new Regulation defines three categories of purchasing agree-
ments that are eligible for a group exemption. The first consists of exclu-
sive purchasing agreements of short and medium duration in all sectors
of the economy.i 8 The other two categories are related to exclusive
purchasing in specific sectors, e.g., beer purchase agreements and petro-
leum products purchase agreements, which are typically long-term con-
tracts.' t 9 This discussion focuses on the more general type of exclusive
purchasing agreement, since the beer and petroleum products agree-
ments are not likely to occur frequently in U.S. export trade.
20
Under Regulation 1984/83, an agreement between two parties
whereby one party agrees to purchase certain goods for resale exclusively
from the other party, is exempt from the prohibition of Article 85(1) if
certain conditions are met.' 2 ' These conditions include limits on the
range of goods that can be covered by an exclusive purchasing agreement
and limits on duration of the arrangement. No such limitations existed
in Regulation 67/67. Regulation 1984/83 prohibits the group exemp-
tion for purchasing agreements containing tie-ins. It excludes from the
exemption any agreements covering "more than one type of goods" un-
less they are related either "by their nature" or "according to commercial
usage."' 122 To be eligible for the exemption, an agreement must have a
duration of five years or less. 123 Agreements of indefinite duration are
not eligible for the group exemption. 124 Like 1983/83, the group exemp-
tion is not available to reciprocal exclusive purchasing agreements be-
tween competitors, and nonreciprocal agreements are sanctioned only for
116 S.A. Brasserie de Haecht v. Consorts Wilkin-Janssen, [1967-1970 Transfer Binder]
COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8053.
117 [1976 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8053.
ii8 Regulation 1984/83, arts. 1-5, supra note 11.
119 Id. arts. 6-13. The Commission has defended its approach to brewery supply contracts
in its Response to Written Question No. 1764/82, 3 COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 10,478.
120 For a further explanation of the provisions concerning the beer and petroleum products
agreements, see Notice Concerning Regulations No. 1983/83 and 1984/83, 3 COMMON MKT.
REP. (CCH) 10,548 at 11,273-276.
121 Regulation 1984/83, arts. 1-3, supra note It.
122 Id art. 3(c).
123 Id. art. 3(d).
124 Id. Agreements that specify a fixed term but are automatically renewable unless one of
the parties gives notice to terminate are considered to be agreements for an indefinite period.
Notice Concerning Regulations No. 1983/83 and 1984/83, 3 COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH)
10,548 at 11,273.
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small and medium-sized companies. 125 The permissible restrictions are
essentially the same as those included in 1983/83.126
It should be noted that 1984/83 exempts only exclusive purchasing
for purposes of resale.12 7 Consequently, it does not cover requirements
contracts when one party commits to purchase from a single supplier its
entire requirement of a product for its own use.
F Withdrawal of the Exemption
When the Council of the EEC, in Regulation 19/65, endowed the
Commission with the power to grant group exemptions, it also gave the
Commission the power to take those exemptions away when agreements
have effects that are incompatible with Article 85(3). 128 Like Regulation
67/67,129 Regulation 1983/83 contains an Article that sets forth the con-
ditions under which the Commission may withdraw the exemption. 130
The new Regulation, however, increases the Commission's withdrawal
authority since it contains certain grounds for withdrawal which did not
appear in Regulation 67/67. Article 6 of Regulation 1983/83 provides
that the Commission can withdraw the benefit of the Regulation when it
finds that a particular exempt agreement is incompatible with Article
85(3).131 The Regulation specifies several situations in which a with-
drawal would be appropriate. The Commission can exercise its power to
withdraw the exemption when the contract goods are not subject to "ef-
fective competition"' 132 in the contract territory, or when distribution by
125 Id. art. 3(a), (b).
126 Id. art. 2.
127 Id. art. 1.
128 Regulation 19/65, art. 7, supra note 45.
129 Regulation 67/67, art. 6, supra note 9.
130 Regulation 1983/83, art. 6, supra note 10, provides:
The Commission may withdraw the benefit of this regulation, pursuant to Article
7 of Regulation No. 19/65/EEC, when it finds in a particular case that an agree-
ment which is exempted by this regulation nevertheless has certain effects which
are incompatible with the conditions set out in Article 85(3) of the Treaty, and in
particular where:
(a) the contract goods are not subject, in the contract territory, to effective
competition from identical goods or goods considered by users as equivalent in
view of their characteristics, price and intended use;
(b) access by other suppliers to the different stages of distribution within
the contract territory is made difficult to a significant extent;
(c) for reasons other than those referred to in Article 3(c) and (d) it is not
possible for intermediaries or users to obtain supplies of the contract goods from
dealers outside the contract territory on the terms there customary;
(d) the exclusive distributor:
1. without any objectively justified reason refuses to supply in the contract
territory categories of purchasers who cannot obtain contract goods elsewhere on
suitable terms or applies to them differing prices or conditions of sale;
2. sells the contract goods at excessively high prices.
Regulation 1984/83 contains a provision for withdrawal of the exemption which is essentially
the same as Article 6 of 1983/83.
131 Regulation 1983/83, supra note 130.
132 Id art. 6(a). Regulation 67/67, Article 6(a) permitted withdrawal when the goods were
not subject to "competition," as distinguished from "effective competition" in Regulation
N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
other suppliers is made "difficult to a significant extent."' 133 In addition,
withdrawal is warranted when, even absent a restriction of the type pro-
hibited by Article 3, it is still not possible for consumers to obtain the
goods by way of parallel imports. 134 Finally, the Regulation takes aim at
specific types of distribution misconduct by sanctioning withdrawal for
refusals to deal when the distributor has no "objectively justified rea-
son"'135 for refusing to supply, or when the distributor sells at "excessively
high prices."' 136 In a provision not contained in Regulation 67/67, the
Commission is authorized to withdraw the exemption when the distribu-
tor engages in price discrimination. 137
The Commission's power to withdraw the exemption under this Ar-
ticle is extremely broad. The conditions that must be met to justify with-
drawal are largely subjective, and the terminology is not well defined.
The Article contains no guidelines as to what constitutes an "excessively
high price," what constitutes a "significant extent" of difficulty in distri-
bution, or what constitutes "effective competition," as opposed to some
other type of competition. Even the determination whether a distributor
has an "objectively justified reason" for refusing to deal appears to be
completely subjective, since we are given no touchstones as to what types
of reasons are justified. It is important that the Commission have the
power to withdraw exemptions in order to ensure that the group exemp-
tion format is not abused, but Article 6 goes too far. Its lack of meaning-
ful standards will undermine the goal of legal certainty in determining
whether a distribution agreement is safely insulated from the applicabil-
ity of Article 85(1).
G Effct of the New Regulation on Existng Agreements
Distribution agreements entered into after December 31, 1983 will
have to comply with the provisions of Regulation 1983/83 in order to
qualify for the group exemption.138 Parties who have entered into agree-
ments before that time will have until December 31, 1986 to bring their
agreements into conformity with Regulation 1983/83. Until that time
they will be governed by the conditions of Regulation 67/67.139 The
same schedule applies to exclusive purchasing agreements under Regula-
1983/83. The addition of the requirement that the competition be "effective" presumably
broadens the Commission's withdrawal powers.
133 Regulation 1983/83, art. 6(b), supra note 130. In contrast, Regulation 67/67, art. 6(b)
required that distribution by other suppliers be "not possible" before withdrawal was justified.
134 Regulation 1983/83, art. 6(c), supra note 130.
135 Id art. 6(d) 1. The 1982 draft Regulation eliminated the "objectively valid reasons"
standard which appeared in Regulation 67/67, thereby authorizing withdrawal for any refusal
to supply, regardless of the reason. The final version of the Regulation, however, returned to
the "objectively justified reason" standard, thereby recognizing that a distributor may have
some voice in deciding with whom it will deal.
136 Regulation 1983/83, art. 6(d)2, supra note 130.
137 Id art. 6(d)1.
138 Regulation 1983/83, art. 7, supra note 10.
139 Id
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tion 1984/83, except that brewery and petroleum products agreements
have until the end of 1988 to be brought into line with the new Regula-
tion. This schedule will provide companies a reasonable period of time
in which to audit their existing agreements, obtain appropriate counsel-
ing, and make whatever revisions may be necessary in the agreements.
IV. Conclusion
Because U.S. exporters frequently use exclusive distribution ar-
rangements to market goods in the Common Market, the EEC Regula-
tion permitting a group exemption for such arrangements is a matter of
great practical importance. The new Regulation has added some flex-
ibility to exclusive distribution agreements by permitting these agree-
ments to cover the entire Common Market rather than merely some
portion of the Common Market. It has also sanctioned nonreciprocal
exclusive distribution agreements between competitors in a small busi-
ness setting. On the other hand, the new Regulation constitutes an effort
by the Commission to foreclose other types of arrangements between
larger competitors, and blocks any effort to use subsidiaries to circum-
vent the provisions of the Regulation. Regulation 1983/83 also makes
explicit the prohibition on absolute territorial protection in any form. In
Regulation 1983/84, the Commission, for the first time, specifically ad-
dresses issues which are unique to exclusive purchasing agreements.
The Commission has brought the regulations on group exemptions
into conformity with the decisions of the Court of Justice, and has solved
many of the technical problems of Regulation 67/67. Some parts of
Regulation 1983/83, however, are still plagued by the absence of clear
standards, especially the provision empowering the Commission to with-
draw the benefit of the group exemption from particular agreements.
On the whole, however, the Commission has balanced adequately the
competing interests involved in exclusive distribution agreements, fairly
accomodating the practical necessity of these agreements while uphold-
ing the goal of the EEC to create a unified market.
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